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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Koordination in VN-Friedensmissionen – Eine theoriegeleitete Herangehensweise 
Die Koordination zwischen verschiedenen Einheiten des Systems der Vereinten 
Nationen (VN) hat in den letzten Jahren sowohl für Praktiker als auch für Akademiker 
zunehmend an Bedeutung gewonnen. Da die Vereinten Nationen immer ambitionierte-
re Aufgaben der Konfliktnachsorge, der Demokratisierung und des Wiederaufbaus in 
Krisenregionen übernehmen, wird der Ruf nach einem koordinierten Vorgehen immer 
lauter – denn keine einzelne VN Unterorganisation kann die Fülle der Aufgaben allein 
bewältigen. Trotzdem haben die Bemühungen der letzten Jahre hin zu mehr Koordina-
tion und Integration bisher nicht die erhofften Ergebnisse gezeigt. Dieses Papier 
möchte zur aktuellen Debatte beisteuern, indem es zuerst das Thema „Koordinati-
on“ von einem theoretischen Blickwinkel aus beleuchtet. Basierend auf den Erkennt-
nissen der Organisationslehre wird ein theoretisches Modell der Koordination entwi-
ckelt – dieses wird dann auf die Vereinten Nationen als Unternehmer von Friedens-
missionen angewandt. Haupterkenntnis ist hierbei, dass, um interorganisationelle 
Koordination innerhalb der Vereinten Nationen zu verbessern, die sozialen und 
strukturellen Koordinationsmechanismen gestärkt werden sollten, die dem netzwerkar-
tigen Charakter des Systems entsprechen – anstatt weiterhin zu versuchen, über das 
ganze System hinweg eine straffe Hierarchie durchzusetzen. 
Schlagworte: Koordination, Multidimensionalität, Organisationslehre, Friedenssiche-
rung 
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ABSTRACT 
Coordination in United Nations Peacebuilding—A Theory-Guided Approach 
Coordination between different United Nations (UN) departments, funds, agencies, 
and programmes has become an issue of increasing concern for scholars and practitio-
ners alike. With the United Nations taking on ever more ambitious roles in countries 
emerging from conflict, no single unit or agency can master the task of post-conflict 
reconstruction, also known as peacebuilding, alone; instead, a concerted effort is 
called for. Recent efforts at reorganizing the way the United Nations works in peace-
building missions have not yielded the desired results of achieving a more coherent, 
and in that way more efficient and more effective UN presence. In order to offer fresh 
inputs for the debate, this paper looks at the issue of coordination from a theoretical 
perspective. Informed by organization theory, a framework for interorganizational 
coordination is developed and then applied to the United Nations and peacebuilding. 
The main finding is that in order to improve interorganizational coordination and in 
lieu of trying to become one streamlined hierarchical organization, the United Nations 
should acknowledge its network character and cultivate those social and structural 
control mechanisms which facilitate coordination in networks. 
Keywords: coordination, multidimensionality, organization theory, peacebuilding 
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BACKGROUND 
International interventions in inter- and intrastate conflicts have experienced a 
marked proliferation since the end of the Cold War. This holds true especially 
for interventions under United Nations (UN) auspices—be they UN-operated or 
UN-mandated operations. As of 31 October 2006, there were roughly 81 000 
uniformed personnel and roughly 16 000 civilian personnel deployed in 16 UN 
peacekeeping missions worldwide.1 
These operations have not only increased in number; they have also been 
deployed under more adverse conditions, with more robust and more far-
reaching mandates. Thus, what had become “traditional UN peacekeeping” 
during the Cold War has more recently been replaced by what is now known as 
“peace enforcement,” “nation building,” “peace building,” and the like.  
Traditional peacekeeping forces were deployed to interposition themselves 
between formerly warring parties and to monitor a ceasefire. Deployment was 
conditional upon consent of the parties, and peacekeepers were allowed to use 
force only in self-defense. Today, peace enforcement occurs when the Security 
Council authorizes a multilateral force to intervene and actually take sides in a 
conflict not yet settled. Here, force can be used in order to achieve a military 
aim. Peacebuilding, state-building, or nation-building (different countries and 
organizations use different terms) describes what is supposed to follow a mili-
tary campaign: the practice of trying to establish structures in a previously 
conflict-ridden territory, which allow for the establishment of sustainable peace, 
even after international forces and civilian workers have left. Especially note-
worthy here is the fact that, with peacebuilding, the military aspect of interven-
tions has become supplemented by civil tasks such as economic reconstruction 
and development as well as administrative reform.2 More specifically, in a UN 
internal effort to systematize what the different departments, agencies, funds, 
and programmes contribute to peacebuilding, activities are grouped in the 
following four broad categories: (1) security and public order, (2) justice and 
                                                          
1 Background note, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 31 October 2006, available 
at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>, last checked 4 January 2007. 
2 This was outlined explicitly in then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s “Sup-
plement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occa-
sion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,” A/50/60-A/1995/1, 3 January 
1995.  
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reconciliation, (3) governance and participation, and (4) socioeconomic well-
being. 
The increase of multilateral interventions both in number and in scope has 
lead to an abundance of literature on the subject, emanating from universities 
and other research institutions, think tanks, as well as from the organizations 
involved themselves. Whereas in the early days of the “new interventionism,” 
most authors’ main concern was the lawfulness or the desirability of an appar-
ent paradigm shift from upholding the principles of state sovereignty and non-
interference to upholding individual human rights,3 a large body of literature 
now deals with the practical difficulties of intervention, ranging across a wide 
selection of issues. Faults or areas in need of improvement have been identified 
at almost every stage of UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding missions. The list is 
long. Concerning mission objectives, criticism points to lack of transparency 
and/or lack of alignment between political rhetoric and the reality of political 
will.4 Concerning operations, the deficits emphasized were the duration of time 
until full deployment, the troops’ lack of interoperability, and inadequate logis-
tical support.5 Concerning personnel, references have been made to a lack of 
regional/cultural knowledge and sensitivity, 6  and insufficient coordination 
among actors in the field.7 
Especially since the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Opera-
tions (“Brahimi report”)8 has the issue of how different parts of the UN system 
can best be brought to work in concert, become a major concern both at the UN 
as well as in the relevant think tanks and research institutions. The Brahimi 
report states, for example, that “effective peacebuilding also requires a focal 
point to coordinate the many different activities that building peace entails.”9 
Thus, both Brahimi’s recommendation to deploy “integrated missions” to the 
field as well as the general question of UN system-wide coordination have been 
                                                          
3 See, for example, de Jonge Oudraat 2000; Chesterman 2001.  
4 Gow 1997; Connaughton 2001. 
5 Berdal 1996; Chesterman 2004. 
6 Pouligny 2005. 
7 Berdal 1996; Sommers 2000. 
8 “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,” A/55/305-S/2000/809, 
21 August 2000. 
9 Ibid., §44. 
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subject to in-depth evaluations10 and have triggered various reform efforts at the 
UN, among the latest of which have been the establishment of a Peacebuilding 
Commission and a Peacebuilding Support Office. The recent High-Level Panel 
on System-Wide Coherence has not explicitly tackled peacebuilding, but many 
of its findings and recommendations can apply to peacebuilding nevertheless.11  
The issue of better coordination in peace operations has now also been 
taken up by UN member states. The Norwegian government, for instance, 
following up on findings and recommendations presented in the Eide report,12 
has launched a project entitled “Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Opera-
tions”—a multi-conference, multi-stakeholder dialogue—in order to draw 
lessons and gather political support for better coordination in peacekeep-
ing/peacebuilding. Thus, the issue of coordination is a timely one and one of 
high political relevance, not least to the populations of those countries in which 
UN peace operations are currently ongoing or likely to start soon.  
Despite the wide-ranging interest in the subject of coordination in peace-
building—and despite its importance—analyses and recommendations to date 
have taken a fairly narrow perspective. The great majority of the peacebuilding 
literature consists either of in-depth case studies of particular missions, edited 
volumes comprising different in-depth case studies and some generalizable 
lessons,13 or volumes expanding on specific themes (coordination being one of 
them—others being, for instance, accountability or local ownership), again 
drawing examples from a variety of case studies. 14  In general, hardly any 
ventures have been undertaken into related disciplines which could inform the 
peacebuilding dialogue in various aspects. For example, although many of the 
shortcomings identified are, arguably, management problems (leadership, 
communication, accountability, etc.), few insights have been taken from other 
disciplines that can offer detailed theoretical knowledge about these issues.15  
                                                          
10 See, for example, Durch et al. 2003 and Eide et al. 2005 on integrated missions; see 
Jones 2002 and Cutillo 2006 on UN coordination.  
11 “Delivering as One—Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on United 
Nations System-Wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assist-
ance and the Environment,” A/61/583, 20 November 2006. 
12 Eide et al. 2005. 
13 For a comprehensive compendium, see, for example, Stedman et al. 2002. 
14 See, for example, Caplan 2005. 
15 Notable exceptions here are, for example, a project by the Global Public Policy Institute 
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As a result, literature on coordination as well as policies to improve it are 
limited in their analyses and consequently in their recommendations. Roberts 
and Bradley, for example, find that “much of the basis of the UN’s coordination 
problem appears to stem from a self-limiting view of peace operations as a 
choice between two extreme alternatives: an ad hoc bottom-up approach or a 
top-down approach to organizing.”16 The ad hoc approach here can also be 
called “coordination by default” and the top-down approach “coordination by 
command.” Both have been tried in the field, but they have either not solved the 
coordination problem to a satisfactory degree or they have generated a whole 
new set of issues and problems such as the question of conflicting objectives of 
different types of international involvement.17 In the scholarly literature, there 
are a limited number of papers which seek to transfer lessons from other disci-
plines onto peacebuilding, but by the authors’ own admissions, these remain 
“initial” or “preliminary” efforts.18 
This paper seeks to go further. The aim is to inform the current debate and 
efforts revolving around the issues of coordination (or, as also used in the 
literature and the policy dialogue, “integration,” “coherence,” or “alignment”) 
by exploring coordination first in an abstract, theoretical way and then to trans-
fer insights onto United Nations peacebuilding. 
What is coordination? What are prerequisites for it? In which ways can 
coordination occur or be undertaken, and what influences that? These questions 
will first be investigated through the lens of organization theory; for, as the title 
of Robert’s and Bradley’s paper, “Organizing for Peace Operations,” suggests, 
how to organize the work of different organizations in countries emerging from 
conflict is what currently occupies practitioners and scholars alike. Organizing 
here is seen as a question of management—issues like structure and processes, 
roles and tasks, and incentives and sanctions in multidimensional peace opera-
tions need to be discussed.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
on organizational learning and peacebuilding and a project by the University of 
Konstanz on administrative science and peacekeeping. 
16 Roberts and Bradley 2005, p. 127. 
17 In the current debate, the issue of whether or how to combine political and humanitarian 
objectives ranges among the most prevalent contentious issues. 
18 Seyboldt 2001; Lipson 2005; Roberts and Bradley 2005; Paris 2006. 
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It is proposed that organization theory can offer tangible insights for the 
topic of coordination—both intra- and interorganizational—and that, by trans-
ferring these onto problems in UN peacebuilding, new answers can be derived 
with regards to why coordination has been difficult in the past and what can be 
done to remove some of these difficulties. United Nations peacebuilding will be 
evaluated against insights from organization theory; some preliminary conclu-
sions with regards to reasons and remedies of unsuccessful coordination efforts 
will be offered.  
The paper is organized in five parts. The following section (section two) 
will explain in more detail how the topic of coordination is framed in organiza-
tion theory. Three basic organization forms—hierarchies, markets, and net-
works—and their concurrent coordination mechanisms will be discussed. In the 
third section, a further level of detail will be reached by proposing a coherent 
model on how coordination works in networks. In the fourth section, by trans-
ferring some of the insights from network theory onto UN peacebuilding, a first 
set of general implications for the UN will be explored. The last section will 
sum up the main findings of the paper as well as propose some initial ideas on 
how coordination could be improved. 
ORGANIZATION THEORY 
Organization theory is the result of the academic study of organizations and its 
constituents. It considers individual and group dynamics in an organizational 
setting, as well as the nature of the organizations themselves. The advent of 
organization theory as an academic discipline is generally traced back to the 
industrial revolution of the 19th century and to the concurrent beginning of 
scientific management, or Taylorism (after its most renowned proponent, 
Frederick Winslow Taylor).19 Scientific management sought to describe how, in 
a (business) organization, work should be broken down into its basic tasks and 
then reassembled again, and how organizational units and individuals should be 
assigned to these tasks in order to maximize effectiveness and efficiency in 
production. According to the scientific management school, the main elements 
of an organization are thus the organizational units which are responsible for 
                                                          
19 Taylor 1911. 
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different tasks and the ties that link these units together, usually by some form 
of communication. Coexistent specialization—i.e., the breaking down of the 
production process and the assignment of workers accordingly—and coordina-
tion (sometimes also termed integration)—i.e., the reconnecting of the various 
intermediate products—are among the essential characteristics of an organiza-
tion; therefore, they are obviously among the main subjects of inquiry of or-
ganization theory. 
Even though organization theory has undergone many permutations and 
has brought forward many “spin-offs” since its origins in the 19th century, 
interpretation of the term coordination has been fairly constant in the organiza-
tion theory context. Coordination is thus the act of bringing different elements 
in a system into alignment. Provan and Milward describe this as follows: 
“Through coordination, an integrated system supposedly minimizes duplication 
of services by multiple provider agencies while increasing the probability that 
all essential services are provided somewhere in the system and that clients will 
have access to these needed services.”20 
Hierarchies, Markets and Networks as Basic Organization Forms 
Organization theory distinguishes between three basic organization forms: 
hierarchies, markets, and networks.21 A discussion of coordination cannot take 
place without referring to the organizational form within which this coordina-
tion is supposed to take place; choosing a particular organization form, as a 
consequence, means that the set of available coordination mechanisms is lim-
ited. The three ideal types and concurrent coordination mechanisms are briefly 
sketched below. 22  Obviously, there is an abundance of hybrid organization 
forms in reality, and different forms of coordination mechanisms can coexist. 
For conceptual clarity, however, it makes sense to consider the abstract, ideal 
types first.  
                                                          
20 Provan and Milward 1995, p. 3. 
21 Originally, organization theory differentiated between markets and hierarchies only, and 
for some time, it was debated whether a network existed merely as a hybrid form 
between market and hierarchy, or whether it had distinct, standalone qualities. Powell 
argued strongly for the latter, and it has by now become standard practice to refer to 
markets, hierarchies, and networks as the three basic types. See Powell 1990.  
22 For a good synthesis, see also Powell 1990; Thompson 2003, chapter 2.  
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A hierarchy (sometimes also called a bureaucracy)23 consists of one or-
ganization. Modern day organizations usually offer a range of products or 
services—this is the purpose of the organization. A characteristic element of a 
hierarchical organization is that it features differentiation both according to 
functional tasks and capabilities (horizontal differentiation) as well as according 
to command and control (vertical differentiation). Functional differentiation 
ensures that specialization can occur: not everybody in the organization carries 
out the same tasks but everybody carries out those tasks for which he/she has a 
certain expertise, knowledge, or disposition, for example. People with the same 
functional expertise are grouped in the same functional unit. Functionally 
distinct units on the same hierarchical level are brought into alignment by a 
common superior. This can happen either through direct personal interaction or 
via impersonal means such as procedural rules, role descriptions, predetermined 
actions, plans, etc.24 The latter is possible because hierarchies are suitable for 
transactions (or processes in general) which happen repeatedly. These transac-
tions or processes can be standardized, and rules according to which these tasks 
ought to be carried out can be specified in advance.  
This “impersonalization of coordination” makes a hierarchy a very effi-
cient type of organization: in most instances, coordination does not have to be 
brought about actively because the rules are laid down in a way so as to guaran-
tee a coordinated outcome. Should uncertainty regarding the proper course of 
action nonetheless occur, the superior has the authority and the power to 
(re)direct the units in a way that he/she sees fit. In this way, uncertainty or 
conflict can be resolved.  
The same features that make hierarchies efficient, however, can also make 
them relatively static, slow at adjusting to external shocks, and possibly de-
tached from the environment in which they operate. Predetermined rules don’t 
leave space for experimentation and innovation, and orders from above may be 
ill-informed.25  
                                                          
23 In organization theory, hierarchy and bureaucracy are sometimes used interchangeably. 
This differs from Max Weber's definition, who characterized bureaucracy, considering 
it to be a special case of hierarchy, namely, hierarchy legitimated by rational-legal 
competence. See Weber 1919. 
24 Van de Ven et al. 1976. 
25 In the private sector, many companies have responded to this pitfall by delegating 
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Juxtaposed with the hierarchical form of organization is a market which 
encompasses an indeterminable number of organizations. Each organization 
creates its own product or service; functional differentiation now becomes 
important between organizations, rather than within a single organization 
(although intra-institutional differentiation, of course, continues to exist). 
Linkages between the organizations only form for the time that a transaction is 
performed across organizational boundaries, i.e., whenever a product or service 
is exchanged between two organizations. Thus, ex ante uncoordinated individ-
ual activities are brought into order by the “invisible hand” of the price mecha-
nism: a price for a given good or service is agreed upon and the transaction 
carried out. Because in this idealized form of the market, there is no one who 
actively links together the transaction partners and no one who influences their 
agreement, coordination is primarily a result—a non-purposeful outcome of the 
rules of the market.26 If no agreement is reached, this prompts at least one of the 
partners to completely withdraw from the transaction—exit is the standard 
response in this case.27 
The third ideal organizational form known by organization theory is the 
network. Diagnosing and describing a network requires that one observes 
interactions between organizations over a period of time. A network exists 
when organizations, though independent, repeatedly transact with one another 
and thus form permanent, albeit loose ties. These connections between organi-
zations may have been established initially to complete one particular, market-
like, transaction; over time, however, personal relations and perhaps even IT- or 
capital-related relations may have been added, thereby contributing to the 
durability of the tie.28 A network of organizations now exists to which each 
organization contributes its particular product or service to the output of the 
entire network. In the car manufacturing industry, for example, there are many 
suppliers which manufacture individual parts or systems for the automobile; the 
                                                                                                                                                                       
authority downwards—some so much so that they have in fact become network-like 
organizations. See, for example, Hedlund 1986; Bartlett and Goshal 1990; Snow et al. 
1992. 
26 Thompson 2003, p. 38. 
27 For an in depth account of options in organizational decline, see Hirshman 1970. 
28 Sydow and Windeler 1994. 
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end product “car” is the product of a network consisting of the chief manufac-
turing company and many suppliers and subcontractors.  
Compared to hierarchies, networks have a more flexible make-up: some 
organizations may participate in the network for a certain amount of time and 
then leave again, or the other organizations may decide not to interact with them 
anymore. For a prolonged period of time, however, the network holds together 
despite the fact that it lacks “a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate 
and resolve disputes that may arise during various transactions.”29 The network 
endures because individual organizations’ goals (profit maximization in the 
private sector) are aligned with the goal of the network,30 and because networks 
have their own ways, for example, of resolving such disputes. 
One could say that networks persistently experience both centrifugal and 
centralizing forces. Networks may seek to overcome coordination difficulties or 
outright conflict by installing a hierarchical element. Organizations would forgo 
some of their independence in order to gain efficiency, heeding, as it were, the 
centralizing force. At the same time, coordination difficulties or conflict—
centrifugal forces—could become so severe that the network breaks apart. The 
result would be a collection of disconnected organizations as in a market.31 
Because of this coexistence of opposing forces, networks have an inherent 
instability that needs to be managed in a specific way. Sydow and Windeler 
assert: “Networks operate on a logic of exchange that is very different from 
both the logic of markets and hierarchies, not least with respect to how this 
logic combines cooperative and competitive elements, autonomy and depend-
ence, trust and control.”32  
                                                          
29 Podolny and Page 1998, p. 59. 
30 Sydow defines this as follows: “Ein Unternehmensnetzwerk stellt eine auf die 
Realisierung von Wettbewerbsvorteilen zielende Organisationsform ökonomischer 
Aktivitäten dar, die sich durch komplex reziproke, eher kooperative denn kompetitive 
und relativ stabile Beziehungen zwischen rechtlich selbständigen, wirtschaftlich jedoch 
zumeist unabhängigen Unternehmen auszeichnet” Sydow 1992, p. 79. “The business 
network represents an organizational form of economic activity designed to secure 
competitive advantage, which is characterized by complex, reciprocal, more coopera-
tive than competitive, relatively stable relations between legally autonomous and, for 
the most part, economically independent enterprises” (author’s translation). 
31 Park and Ungson 2001. 
32 Sydow and Windeler 1998, p. 267. 
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The delicate equilibrium of the network is maintained mainly by mecha-
nisms of social control, which will be discussed in detail in section three. For 
the time being, it should suffice to say that once network partners maintain 
longer-term relations with one another, transactions become “structurally 
embedded” in these social relations. 33  Network partners not only have the 
information about one another’s organization captured in the price data of their 
products or services; over time, they also get to know something about one 
another’s expertise, working style and professionalism, and perhaps even about 
individual capabilities, resources, and constraints. This enables mechanisms of 
social control such as reputation or organizational culture to govern the network. 
As a result, problems among the participants are dealt with by mechanisms of 
voice (renegotiations, adjustments, and the like) rather than exit (the problem-
coping mechanism in markets) or command (the ultimate problem-coping 
mechanism in hierarchies). 
Determinants of Organization Forms 
One set of questions that organization theorists have considered extensively has 
to do with the choice of organization form. What determines which actions and 
transactions are carried out within one organization (i.e., a hierarchy), and what 
determines what happens across organizations (i.e., in a market or a network)? 
Which organizational form is most suitable in which kind of environment? 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one of the main schools in organization 
theory, which has dealt extensively with these questions.34 
The central proposition of TCE is that an organization’s purpose is to fa-
cilitate transactions between different units at the lowest possible transaction 
cost. Transactions can be exchanges of goods and services, information, or 
resources, for example. TCE holds that the nature of the goods being exchanged, 
the frequency of the exchange, the complexity of the environment, and the 
                                                          
33 Granovetter (1985) actually holds that “all human attempts at purposive action are … 
embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (p. 487). He intended his 
work as a critique of pure transaction cost economists like Oliver Williamson, for 
example, who would deny such embeddedness for market transactions.  
34 Initial thoughts regarding these questions were put forward by R. H. Coase in 1937; the 
most prominent proponent of transaction cost economics today is Oliver E. Williamson. 
See, for example, Williamson 1967, 1981a, 1981b. 
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character of the exchange partners all determine which organizational form is 
most suitable.  
To go into the details of TCE would go beyond the scope of this paper. 
For present purposes, it should suffice to state that, according to TCE, one-off 
transactions in which the subject of exchange is easily quantified and valued are 
best carried out in a market, because the market is the most efficient forum in 
this case. In contrast, repeated transactions and transactions of goods which are 
more difficult to specify or more intangible are best carried out within one 
organization, i.e., within a hierarchy. Because of opportunism, market transac-
tions entail not only search but also monitoring costs; these increase the more 
“fuzzy” the nature of the transaction becomes. For such transactions, a hierar-
chy (bureaucracy) is more suitable because “the rules in a bureaucracy mini-
mize the need for continual, close inspection of the exchange in order to ensure 
that neither party cheats the other because both parties in the transaction have 
common investments in the bureaucracy governing the transaction.”35  
With regards to networks, Powell states that “the open-ended quality of 
networks is most useful when resources are variable and the environment 
uncertain.”36 He states that “commodities whose value is not easily measured” 
such as “know-how, technological capability, a particular approach or style of 
production, a spirit of innovation or experimentation” can be exchanged very 
well within networks.37  Ness and Brechin, alluding to a network, similarly 
contend that “under conditions of high heterogeneity and instability, organiza-
tional performance is enhanced by flat functional divisions of labor, which are 
linked together by specific integrative mechanisms.”38 
That said, Powell and others see motives other than the minimization of 
transaction costs as the main explanatory variables for the development of 
networks. Powell, for example, acknowledges that network forms of organiza-
tion can sometimes entail comparatively high transaction costs, but he main-
tains that these are mitigated by other clear advantages the network has vis-à-vis 
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37 Powell 1990, p. 304. 
38 Ness and Brechin 1988, p. 254. 
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markets and hierarchies in certain environments.39 He holds, for example, that 
networks are more flexible than hierarchies, and therefore adapt to changing 
circumstances better. Being independent, individual units do not need to wait 
for orders from above to adjust their behavior. At the same time, however, a 
mutual orientation and “the entangling strings of reputation, friendship, interde-
pendence, and altruism”40 ensure that the network units still move in the same 
direction and take the others into account when altering their course.  
Others emphasize that the exchange of tacit knowledge and the commit-
ment to joint problem-solving in networks foster organizational learning and 
make networked organizations more innovative than their competitors.41 Ac-
cording to Thompson, “tacit knowledge is that which cannot be explicitly 
codified but which rests in implicit personal or institutional practices. … Tacit 
knowledge cannot be written down or copied.”42 
Networks are well-suited fora for exchanging tacit knowledge, because 
“information passed through networks is “thicker” than information obtained in 
the market, and “freer” than communicated in a hierarchy.”43 Uzzi’s example, 
the concept of style in the fashion industry, illustrates this nicely: It is very 
difficult and time-consuming to accurately describe a particular style by refer-
ring to only components such as color, garment, cut, and the like; some infor-
mation is also bound to get lost. However, when network partners know each 
other well and have been working together for some time, they can convey 
easily what they are looking for by referring to a particular style, even if this is 
“more implied than overtly expressed.”44 The exchange and mutual understand-
ing of tacit knowledge allows network partners over time to get to know, under-
stand, and forecast the other’s behavior better; and such learning gives them a 
competitive edge over other organizations.  
Nevertheless, should problems arise, organizations in a well-functioning 
network resort to joint problem-solving arrangements. These are “routines of 
                                                          
39 Powell 1990, pp. 322-327. 
40 Ibid., p. 303-304. 
41 Uzzi 1997; Podolny and Page 1998. 
42 Thompson 2006, p. 11. 
43 Powell 1990, p. 304. 
44 Uzzi 1997, p. 45. 
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negotiation and mutual adjustment that flexibly resolve problems.”45 In contrast 
to what would happen in a market—namely, that one or all organizations would 
simply resign from the transaction—networked organizations respond by 
working things out together, i.e., by using mechanisms of voice. The achieve-
ment of a goal is more important than the completion of the transaction accord-
ing to previously specified parameters: when a problem with the parameters 
occurs, mutual adjustment or renegotiation takes place. Joint problem-solving 
arrangements minimize costs because investments made before the problem 
occurred are not lost (thereby becoming sunk costs), but can be rescued by 
working out a different solution. Again, joint problem-solving arrangements 
also contribute to organizational learning, because network partners get instant 
feedback regarding the suitability and desirability of their actions—something 
that would be lost if a tie were quickly severed upon the emergence of a prob-
lem.  
The Network as the Most Suitable Model for UN Peacebuilding 
From the description of the basic organizational forms and the conditions under 
which they strive, as well as from some deliberations presented in chapter three, 
it becomes apparent that the network is the most appropriate subject of enquiry 
regarding coordination in UN peacebuilding for a number of reasons. These can 
broadly be grouped into the categories “what is” and “what should be.” In other 
words, I would like to argue here that, on the one hand, the UN peacebuilding 
machinery looks most like a network and, on the other, it should function like a 
network given the demands of the peacebuilding context and the advantages 
networks have vis-à-vis other organizational forms according to TCE.46 Conse-
quently, the coordination in networks should be further investigated. 
The network presents itself as the appropriate model, first, from a struc-
tural perspective. The collective of United Nations departments, funds, pro-
grammes, and specialized agencies that is involved in peacebuilding missions 
comes most closely to a network in terms of its basic make-up: It consists of a 
number of organizations that enjoy varying degrees of independence vis-à-vis 
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the United Nations system. The specialized agencies, for example, are legally 
independent international organizations with their own rules, membership, 
organs, and financial resources. Some existed as early as before World War I; 
some were created by the United Nations themselves to meet emerging needs. 
Each agency is brought into relationship with the United Nations by a negoti-
ated agreement. The funds and programmes, on the other hand, are subordinate 
to the United Nations but under the immediate supervision of their own inter-
governmental bodies; they derive most of their financial resources from means 
other than the UN budgets and, as a result, they also enjoy some degree of 
independence.47  
The number of peacebuilding organizations that belong to the UN system 
is limited (even if more UN agencies are involved in peace operations today 
than probably were in the early peacekeeping days). And the make-up of the 
peacebuilding network is malleable, varying from one mission to the next and 
perhaps even within missions over time, as different organizations may take 
part in different missions, and roles assumed may differ accordingly, both 
across and within missions. Thus, one can assume that organizations of the UN 
system enjoy relationships with one another that endure over time, but that 
these relationships are nevertheless more flexible than they would be in a 
hierarchy. 
Second, it seems that a network would actually be the most suitable form 
for coordinating the different UN entities in a peacebuilding effort. Practically 
every observer agrees that the conditions under which peacebuilding is sup-
posed to take place are highly complex and fast changing, requiring quick 
learning and adaptation, and that the tasks to be performed jointly and the goals 
to be achieved are often fairly intangible—for example, the strengthening of 
civil society or the institutionalization of democracy.48 In peacebuilding, the UN 
operates under conditions “of high heterogeneity and instability” and therefore, 
arguably, needs “flat functional divisions of labor [and] special integrative 
mechanisms”49; but many assert that these are currently not in place. Jones, for 
                                                          
47 For further information see the website of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination 
of the United Nations System at <http://unsystemceb.org>, last checked on 11 January 
2007. 
48 Newman and Rich 2004. 
49 Ness and Brechin 1988, p. 254. 
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example, asks provocatively: “Are the policy coordination tools developed in 
the 1990s flexible and nuanced enough to provide credible options in the face of 
real-world variety in context?” His answer is “clearly no.”50 And Haas, albeit in 
a slightly different context, labels what had been designed to be “interlocking 
institutions” as “interblocking institutions” instead.51  Other practitioners and 
scholars have actually already called attention to more network-like approaches 
in international organizations, but they have not specified the concept of the 
network further, nor exactly how this should play out in international organiza-
tions.52 As early as 1997, Jessica Tuchman Matthews exclaims in her renowned 
article “Power Shift”:  
In drastically lowering the costs of communication, consultation, and coordina-
tion, [information technologies] favor decentralized networks over other modes 
of organization. In a network, individuals or groups link for joint action without 
building a physical or formal institutional presence. … Governments, on the 
other hand, are quintessential hierarchies, wedded to an organizational form in-
compatible with all that the new technologies make possible.53 
Third, it seems plausible that a peacebuilding network will be the most appro-
priate model in the field in terms of important considerations other than coordi-
nation.54 It has already been mentioned, for example, that networks are more 
nimble, that is, that they respond to changing circumstances better than hierar-
chies. Networks also learn quicker and are more innovative, especially in 
knowledge-based fields. Hierarchies, on the other hand, are susceptible to lock-
in and strong organizational couplings, which place a heavy burden on the 
different units because they prevent innovation and make the organization 
rigid.55 Some peacebuilding practitioners note that, in peacebuilding, too much 
concern for formal coordination structures may sometimes have the opposite, 
detrimental effect, namely, that staff neglect their actual tasks and spend too 
                                                          
50 Jones in Donini et al. 2004, p. 216. 
51 Haas 2002. 
52 See, for example, Tuchman Matthews 1997; Reinicke and Deng 2000; Ruggie 2003. 
53 Tuchman Matthews 1997. 
54 Admittedly, this is not yet confirmed nor disproved—practitioners have not yet 
explicitly focused on the network as a model in peacebuilding. True, some form of 
network-like structures have probably emerged in every mission, but it can be argued 
that these have not yet been set up, developed and evaluated systematically. 
55 Thompson 2003. 
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much time coordinating with others. What is more, because one is so busy 
coordinating, he/she does not even realize that important work is left undone. 
One observer here warned: “People can talk themselves into a mindset at these 
[coordination] fora, without actually doing [their work].”56 A network with its 
largely informal structure may therefore be better suited to enabling effective 
work. 
It is also reasonable to expect that a network-like mission will cope better 
with the issue of local ownership than a hierarchy would. As mentioned earlier, 
the question of how an international presence with wide-ranging administrative 
powers is supposed to engender buy-in from the local population and build 
capacity such that the structures it establishes are sustainable is one that con-
stantly engages scholars and practitioners.57 A hierarchy here may be unsuitable, 
because it can be perceived as a closed system which subsumes all necessary 
functions within its boundaries. Of the three models of organization, the hierar-
chy is the most autarkic system; people in hierarchies have a greater predisposi-
tion to be inward-looking and, consequently, they do not look beyond the 
organizational boundaries of that system for information or other inputs. A 
hierarchical peacebuilding organization arguably, therefore, runs the risk of 
remaining closed off from the population it is supposed to serve and neglecting 
the structures it is supposed to build simply because of the lack of any incentive 
to do otherwise. Pouligny, for example, attributes to the staffs of international 
organizations and NGOs an attitude of being the most important actors in the 
peacebuilding process—a stance which she criticizes.58  
One result of this attitude and corresponding behavior can be that the UN 
builds parallel structures in the countries where it operates; because of the 
higher profile it has and the better salaries it pays, it often depletes those struc-
tures that do exist locally and, in that way, it undermines the building up of 
sustainable, local administrations. The lack of sustainability can perhaps be seen 
most vividly when buildings that had previously been occupied or even built for 
the UN are left empty after the UN leaves.59 A more nimble network with its 
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57 See, for example, Caplan 2004; Chesterman 2004; Chesterman forthcoming. 
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59 Author's interview. 
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outward rather than inward focus might be more attune to taking into account 
and incorporating local structures. Chesterman, too, finds it “disingenuous … to 
assert that a successful transitional administration requires both centralized 
control in the hands of a well-resourced special representative and ownership 
on the part of the local population.”60 
Finally, one could argue that the concept of a fully-integrated, hierarchical 
international presence would be misplaced on ideological grounds as well. 
Stockton makes a very vivid case here, highlighting the contradictions inherent 
in current international thinking and practice. Even though he focuses on devel-
opment, his conclusions can arguably be applied to the peacebuilding endeavor 
as a whole: 
One of the great conundrums of the modern international aid system is that it li-
onizes strategic planning, coordination, cooperation, and collaboration, and 
frowns upon overt expressions of independence and organizational competitive-
ness. Yet paradoxically, “developmentalism,” in theory at least, is the champion 
of diversity, innovation, tolerance, economic competitiveness, and political, so-
cial, and cultural pluralism. Indeed, contemporary civil society is supposed to be 
a manifestation, even a celebration of the triumph of these liberal societal values 
over the stultifying hand of state socialism with its overblown five-year strategic 
plans, and “development” dealt out project by inefficient project, a simulacrum 
of which is oddly still adhered to by the international aid system.61 
In the end, some potential caveats remain. Even if the network fits best in terms 
of structure, environment, and task, there may be some disparities between a 
supposed UN network and the business networks, which gave rise to the con-
current observations and precepts in organization theory. One is the fact that the 
collection of UN agencies is not as much an organically grown network as 
networks observed elsewhere are; this may have implications for the dynamism 
of the social control mechanisms for coordination. The other is the fact that 
incentives for UN agencies to participate in a network may not be as immediate 
as they are for business organizations: whereas business organizations suppos-
edly have direct economic benefits such as access to information and mitigation 
of resource dependencies from network participation, this may not be as tangi-
ble for UN agencies. As one practitioner noted, “in a bureaucratic structure, the 
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bottom line is not so clear.”62 A full discussion of how this may become impor-
tant has to be postponed at this point, but these caveats should nevertheless be 
kept in mind when trying to transfer insights from network theory onto the issue 
of coordination in peacebuilding. For now, it must suffice to consider how 
coordination and conflict resolution are achieved in networks, and—particularly 
important for the transferability of insights—what the prerequisites for this are. 
As these are mechanisms that are meant to achieve purposeful outcomes, they 
are subsumed under the term “network governance.”63 
COORDINATION IN NETWORKS 
Prerequisites for network governance 
For the social control mechanisms of network governance to function, certain 
prerequisites have to be satisfied. Although implied in the descriptions of ideal 
network forms, these are hardly ever mentioned explicitly in the literature. It 
can only be presumed here that this is the case because they can be regarded as 
certainties in the (business) context in which most network theory is situated—
were the prerequisites not fulfilled, a network would not have formed. However, 
because the same kind of organic growth cannot be entirely assumed for the 
“UN network,” those prerequisites should be stated explicitly, because they will 
become important later for coordination via social control mechanisms at the 
UN. 
First, it should be noted that organizations in a network share an overall 
goal. To achieve this goal jointly is why they participate in the network in the 
first place, and what each organization can be held accountable for. The vision 
of a common goal to which each organization contributes helps to align and, if 
necessary, discipline participating organizations. 
                                                          
62 Author’s interview. 
63 Thompson (2003, p. 37) defines this as follows: “By coordination we mean that the 
elements in the system are somehow brought into an alignment, considered and act 
together. By governance we mean the regulation of these elements; the effectiveness of 
the reproduction of their alignment and coordination. […] At the ‘coordination end’ we 
have processes that simply bring together elements into an ordered pattern, but not 
necessarily by intent of design—non-purposeful outcomes. At the other ‘governance 
end’ we have mechanisms that overtly order and govern by direction and design—
‘purposeful outcomes’.”  
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Second, each organization contributes its particular expertise towards this 
common goal, meaning that there is functional differentiation across the net-
work. Some relation must certainly exist between the organizations and some 
familiarity with one another’s output; there may even be some overlap in areas 
of operation. But what makes the network strong (at least under specific cir-
cumstances) is that it draws on individual organizations’ proficiencies to pro-
duce something that one organization could not produce alone, at least not as 
efficiently and effectively. This is also an incentive for each organization to 
cultivate its relations to other network members: each organization is aware of 
the interdependence that results from functional differentiation.  
Third, the network has to maintain its ties, i.e., the relationships that exist 
between the organizations. In its most basic form, these ties resemble channels 
across which information and resources are exchanged between organizations. 
Ties are also important because, in order for social control mechanisms to work, 
information needs to be relayed throughout the network: if nothing about an 
organization’s performance were known, for example, other organizations could 
not draw the appropriate consequences, be they positive or negative. 
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that employees in networks need to 
have somewhat different qualities than employees in hierarchical organizations. 
This holds true especially for network managers and “boundary spanners,” i.e. 
those employees who direct individual network units or organizations and those 
who bridge the gaps between them64 (individual employees can certainly have 
overlapping functions here). For example, the significance of communication 
for the proper functioning of network governance means that a large proportion 
of network employees must be great communicators. They must filter, process, 
and relay information throughout the network; they must enjoy the exchange 
with other people and organizations, and actively engage in this task. Further-
more, because of the relative independence of the individual units, employees in 
network organizations must be capable of strategic thinking and handling. 
Because of the expectation that such persons perform without constant supervi-
sion and detailed orders from above, they need to be self-propelled and take 
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initiative, all the time keeping in mind the goals and well-being of the entire 
network. Hedlund foresees this as early as 1986; among other things, he pro-
poses that network managers must have the following skills: 
• aptitude for searching and combining elements in new ways, 
• skill in communicating ideas and rapidly turning them into action, 
• willingness to take risks and experiment, 
• “faith” in the company and its activities, 
• honesty and personal integrity.65 
Thus, a common goal, functional differentiation, information (and possibly 
other resources) flow, and appropriate personnel are highlighted here as the 
prerequisites for network governance. 
Network Governance: Social Control Elements 
As outlined above, coordination and conflict resolution in networks are exer-
cised via social control, i.e. via mechanisms of voice. This is possible because 
transactions in a network are structurally embedded.66 According to Jones et al.:  
Network governance involves a select, persistent and structured set of autono-
mous firms (as well as non-profit agencies) engaged in creating products or ser-
vices based on implicit and open-ended contracts to adapt to environmental con-
tingencies and to coordinate and safeguard exchanges. These contracts are so-
cially, not legally, binding.67 
As with the other topics in organization theory, there is an extensive body of 
literature that tackles specific aspects of network governance, and these works 
are sometimes not easily reconciled. 68  Nevertheless, some general themes 
emerge, which are detailed below. Furthermore, the attempt has been made to 
order them in such a way that the relations between the different elements of 
network governance become clear. Admittedly, this is probably not the only 
possible way to achieve this, but it is among the first such comprehensive 
efforts to disentangle and organize the different elements of network govern-
ance. 
                                                          
65 Hedlund 1986, pp. 29-32. 
66 Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1997. 
67 Jones et al. 1997, p. 914. 
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As outlined above, network governance must both coordinate network 
partners as well as safeguard exchanges between them; in that way, centralizing 
and centrifugal forces in the network are dealt with. Accordingly, there are 
mechanisms that fulfill the first role, and mechanisms that fulfill the latter—
some fulfill both. Jones et al. identify reputation and collective sanctions as 
mechanisms for safeguarding exchanges and organizational culture as a mecha-
nism for coordination. Access restriction, the fourth mechanism, serves both 
purposes.69  
Access restriction means limiting the number of organizations that can 
participate in the network. According to Powell, “by establishing enduring 
patterns of repeat trading, networks restrict access.”70 Organizations in a net-
work first and foremost interact with one another; thus, the total number of 
organizations is limited. 
Having a limited number of organizations in a network safeguards ex-
changes, first, because it limits the amount of monitoring (of other organiza-
tions) one organization must do. There is only a finite number of organizations 
to be monitored, thus each one can be monitored more easily. Second, when 
there are a limited number of organizations that can interact with one another, 
each organization knows that it finds itself in a situation of “repeated games”: 
the chance that it will deal with the same organization again is highly likely. 
This “shadow of the future” increases the incentive to cooperate and behave 
faultlessly or, conversely, decreases the incentive to shirk and seek short-term 
instead of long-term profit. Third, having fewer partners who interact more 
often increases the social embeddedness of interactions: organizations that 
interact with one another get to know each other better; they understand the 
other’s motives and reasons for behaving a certain way, they can more easily 
find common ground, and they perceive their respective interests as aligned.71 
Thus, fewer misunderstandings—events where active coordination is called 
for—take place. Fourth, repeated interactions permit organizations to institu-
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tionalize or formalize their relationship in a certain way, i.e., by developing 
communication protocols or developing work routines.72  Such formalization 
amounts to an impersonalization of coordination akin to how a good deal of 
coordination is achieved within (hierarchical) organizations. 
Organizational culture is another coordinating mechanism, for it provides 
“broad, tacitly understood rules for appropriate action under unspecified cir-
cumstances.”73 Organizational culture is arguably a more amorphous concept 
than access restriction, for example, especially because different authors define 
it more or less broadly. Here, organizational culture is understood first and 
foremost as “ideas [and] values … that are specific to a given organization and 
have special relevance to its members.” 74  Organizational culture then also 
exemplifies trade-offs between values, for example, consensus versus efficiency 
or quality versus cost.  
According to Camerer and Vepsalainen, organizational culture becomes 
manifest to employees via focal principles (for example, “the customer is king,” 
“client first,” or, in the case of many humanitarian organizations, “impartial-
ity”).75 These principles can be articulated in a number of ways, from employ-
ment contracts to mission statements to prominently displayed slogans etc. 
Somewhat more subtly, visibility may also be aided by “war-stories” that are 
transmitted through the organization and that recount the application of one 
such principle by an employee. Thus, “a myth, a ritual, or other symbol … 
directs individual action in collective endeavor toward common goals.” 76 
Needless to say, for such symbols to create a distinctive organizational culture, 
they need to be consistent with one another, and they need to be enacted in a 
way that is consistent over time. 
Organizational culture facilitates coordination because it is embodied in 
routines that describe “the way things are done around here” to all employees. If 
internalized, this means that employees will have a shared understanding of the 
conventions in the organization, and their assumptions, expectations, predic-
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tions, and evaluations of other employees’ actions are more likely to be correct. 
Furthermore, “it becomes possible to rapidly share information, interpret the 
meaning of events in and outside the organization in similar ways, and see 
opportunities for local action in the interest of the global good.”77 
The same can, albeit perhaps to a lesser extent, work across organiza-
tions—i.e., in a network. Snow et al. assert: “Networks operate efficiently when 
member firms voluntarily behave as if they are all part of a broader organization 
sharing common objectives and rewards. … The network must somehow create 
an organization “culture” that transcends ownership,”78 that is, organizations in 
a network must share the same values and ideas as well as the prioritization 
among them. These values could then translate into the same or at least similar 
(explicit or implicit) rules of behavior and performance criteria. Thus, Lawler 
holds that, “when a common set of values can be defined, self-managing units 
can focus on goals and performance results that are consistent with those val-
ues.”79  
Cultures become assimilated, or a shared culture develops, when employ-
ees interact frequently with one another or when there is occupational exchange 
between employees of different organizations, lateral promotion, and the like. 
Gulati describes this as follows: “Actors who are strongly tied to each other are 
likely to develop a shared understanding of the utility of certain behaviors as a 
result of discussing opinions in strong, socializing relations, which in turn 
influence their actions.”80 “Acculturation” is also furthered when norms, rules, 
and understandings of a particular profession (like doctors, lawyers, humanitar-
ian workers, etc.) are articulated and construed by independent “authorities” 
such as a professional school, a union, a lobbying group, or a prominent leader. 
Shared cultures, therefore, “evolve out of long-term repeated transactions but … 
are sustained by an institutional infrastructure.”81 They help to coordinate the 
actions of different organizations. 
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Reputation is information about an organization conveyed to other net-
work members regarding its character, skills, and reliability.82 Behavior and 
performance which are consistent over time give an organization a reputation, 
for example, for speedy execution of tasks or for good quality of products. 
(Negative reputations are of course also possible.) Reputation can relay infor-
mation about one organization to members of another organization without the 
two having actually made contact. Thus, under conditions of uncertainty, 
reputation allows one organization to at least partially forecast the other organi-
zation’s behavior. Based on this information, one organization might decide 
whether to work on a joint project with the other organization, whether to 
transmit information, or whether to take information received from them at face 
value. 
Because each organization is aware that others behave like this, it has an 
interest in having and maintaining a good reputation. This in turn discourages 
organizations from seeking short-term gains at the expense of other network 
members. Ring and Van de Ven explain that, because networks operate with a 
significant shadow of the future, reputation safeguards exchanges because 
participating organizations have an interest in having good reputations. 83 
Equally, Jarillo states: “The entrepreneur … will behave correctly because, even 
if in this particular circumstance he or she could gain from opportunistic behav-
ior, such behavior would destroy his or her reputation, thus making the total 
outcome of the opportunistic behavior undesirable.”84 
Furthermore, because organizations are aware of their interdependence 
with other organizations, they also have an interest in detecting and verifying 
the reputation of others, and disseminating the relevant information throughout 
the network. A reputation for opportunistic behavior, for instance, can quickly 
spill over from one organization onto the next, when a perceived lack of correc-
tive behavior marks the organizations as “accomplices.” Therefore, when the 
gains to be had from network membership are appreciated by its members, 
information about reputation should be relayed throughout the network. 
                                                          
82 Jones et al. 1997, p.932. 
83 Ring and Van de Ven 1992, p. 489. 
84 Jarillo 1988, p. 37. 
Anna Herrhausen • Coordination in UN Peacebuilding 25
 
 
It is easy to see that without the potential for sanctions, reputation as such 
is of little relevance. Jones et al. hold that collective sanctions mean that net-
work members punish those that do not behave according to shared norms and 
goals; sanctions can range from “gossip and rumors to ostracism and sabo-
tage.”85 Baum and Ingram also find that “competitive firms within a dense 
network … quickly establish norms of cooperation because firms trust that the 
well organized network will facilitate collective monitoring and sanctioning, 
producing an effective incentive for cooperation.”86 
In a network, corresponding to the relevant information disseminated con-
cerning organizations’ reputations, collective sanctioning may be supported by 
a meta-norm—namely, one specifying that those network partners who have 
detected opportunistic behavior in others, but fail to relay this to the rest of the 
group ought to be sanctioned as well. In this way, collective sanctions safeguard 
exchanges, because they “define and reinforce parameters of acceptable behav-
ior.”87 
In this model, access restriction, culture, reputation and sanctions are de-
scribed as the main elements of social control in network governance. It should 
be noted that these constitutive mechanisms are mutually reinforcing: for 
example, restricted access engenders repeated interaction of those who are in 
the network. This, in turn, contributes to the development of a shared culture. It 
also means that individual organizations seek to build a good reputation, and 
that collective sanctioning will occur if values and norms are breached. The 
flipside of this is that there exists some degree of interdependence between the 
social control mechanisms; thus network governance cannot be achieved by one 
mechanism alone. For example, one could argue that a shared culture is neces-
sary for making reputation intelligible—that is, network members must regard 
certain norms with at least similar levels of esteem in order for reputation to be 
meaningful and, if necessary, for sanctions to be initiated. Network governance 
via social control is most effective when the mechanisms are applied in concert. 
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Network Governance: Structural Elements  
So far, network governance as described has said nothing about the make-up or 
structure of a network. At first this may appear strange, especially if one keeps 
in mind that, within a hierarchy, coordination is so explicitly linked to questions 
of structure: Who has authority over whom? Who gives orders and who follows 
them? Who is responsible for the fulfillment of some particular task, and who is 
responsible for another? Who reports to whom, and in what way?  
As seen in the preceding sections, for the social control mechanisms in 
networks, these questions are not of primary importance. Networks generally 
operate on notions of parity, not hierarchy. However, it has been noted that, 
sometimes in networks, a “hierarchical element” can be introduced to enhance 
efficiency. 88  Accordingly, Sydow and Windeler assert that “although rather 
decentralized, somewhat polycentric and a possible outcome of collective 
strategies, an interorganizational network may well be strategically led by some 
focal or ‘hub’ organization.”89 In a similar vein, Litwak and Hylton introduce 
the concept of the coordinating agency, a “formal organization whose major 
purpose is to order behavior between two or more other formal organizations by 
communicating pertinent information …, by adjudicating areas of dispute …, 
by providing standards of behavior …, by promoting areas of common interest 
…, and so forth”.90  
Litwak and Hylton’s account is noteworthy because the authors identify 
certain conditions for the preponderance of coordinating agencies: 
(1) organizational interdependence, (2) awareness of this interdependence, and 
(3) standardization of the units to be coordinated. These conditions are deemed 
to be prerequisites in order for coordinating agencies to develop and for which 
they must strive. The authors assert that, first, coordination would not be neces-
sary if there were no interdependence between organizations. If the actions of 
one organization had no effects on the opportunities and constraints facing 
another, and vice-versa, neither would have to take the other into account. 
Second, because of the absence of hierarchy, coordination would also be ex-
tremely difficult if this interdependence and the resulting need to coordinate 
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were not recognized by the parties concerned. And third, coordination between 
two entities could not be carried out by a third entity if there were not some 
measure of standardization of that which is supposed to be coordinated. “In 
order for a coordinating agency to operate efficiently, it must develop special-
ists. For such specialists to develop, however, the behavior to be coordinated 
has to be standard in character.”91 The implication of this is that coordinating 
agencies in networks cannot be in charge of managing and coordinating every-
thing. Only those instances which occur repeatedly and where the process can 
be standardized at least to some extent can be subject to coordination by desig-
nated agencies.  
Litwak and Hylton maintain that the need for these conditions to be met is 
something that is unique for networks. In contrast, it is not at all critical for the 
establishment of coordinating mechanisms within hierarchies. Thus, according 
to the authors, one would find in intra-organizational analysis (i.e., within one 
organization) that  
the leadership might institute coordinating mechanisms because they are aware 
of interdependence where units to be coordinated are unaware of this; or they 
might introduce coordinating mechanisms not to increase efficiency of the or-
ganization but to perpetuate their own authority structure; or they might intro-
duce coordinating mechanisms despite lack of standardization because they feel 
this might speed up the process of standardization.92 
With this counterfactual example, the authors again illustrate how coordination 
in a network is different from coordination in a hierarchy—even if one inserts 
“hierarchical elements” like coordinating agencies. 93  They show that in a 
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network, the authority of one organization over others requires permissive 
conditions, and that authority must be voluntarily granted and recognized.94 
Authority merely by virtue of being “above” someone else is not sufficient.95 
Park and Ungson agree that the institutionalization of what they call “a 
proper governance mechanism” cannot be forced upon network members. 
Because organizations forego some of their independence when they set up 
such governance mechanisms, Park and Ungson believe that the only relevant 
incentive to do so is the belief that such action would lead to “sufficient eco-
nomic gains.”96 
Not only are the prerequisites for establishing dedicated coordinators dif-
ferent in networks than they are in hierarchies, the measures which these coor-
dinators have at their disposal are different, too. That is, given that the absence 
of hierarchy means that a coordinating agency can probably apply sanctioning 
mechanisms only to a limited extent (relying on other organizations and collec-
tive sanctions for more severe measures); it must focus primarily on creating 
incentives for other organizations to be coordinated. Network management must 
be “facilitative, not directive.”97 According to Litwak and Hylton, coordinating 
agencies communicate, adjudicate, provide information, and promote common 
areas of interest—but how do they become effective in doing so? 
Most authors here agree on the underlying logic; the argumentation is 
roughly thus:98 A central organization99 has a privileged position vis-à-vis other 
organizations in the network. Central organizations have established more links 
to other organizations in the network than any single one of them has individu-
ally. As a result, they can serve as communication channels and “provide 
                                                                                                                                                                       
communication; they are not hierarchically organized, but heterarchically constructed” 
(author’s translation). 
94 See also, Boje and Whetten 1981. 
95 Apart from consent of network members, Whetten envisions an outside authority source 
such as the state or federal government as the designer of a coordinating agency. 
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needs as well the consent of other network members. See Whetten 1981, p. 101. 
96 Park and Ungson 2001, p. 47. 
97 Ruggie 2003. 
98 See, for example, Wren 1967; Whetten 1981; Astley and Sachdeva 1984; Kogut and 
Zander 1996; Sydow and Windeler 1998. 
99 The terms “central,” “focal,” “hub,” or “linking pin organization” are used interchange-
ably in the literature. 
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services that link third parties to one another by transferring resources, informa-
tion, or clients.”100 Because such functions are most effectively and efficiently 
carried out by a central organization, this organization gains status vis-à-vis the 
others in the network and becomes a “primus inter pares”, a first among equals. 
This status is reinforced because the central organization can then use its privi-
leged position to exert influence upon the network itself; it has, for example, 
some degree of discretion with regards to what information is passed on and to 
whom. It can also serve as a role model for other organizations to imitate. Or it 
can engage actively in the setting of standards and assigning of roles within the 
network. To sum up, the central organization becomes “strongly involved in the 
process in which the symbols, interpretive schemes, knowledge, norms, under-
standing and ways of doing business are reproduced.”101 In the eyes of network 
members, standards for management and evaluation then appear less arbitrary 
than such standards sometimes do in hierarchies—another reason why members 
of a network might willingly subscribe to the directions of the coordinating 
agencies.102 In reality, a central organization actively shapes network culture, 
i.e., “the way things are done around here” and, in so doing, it can further 
consolidate its own predominance in a network. All in all, centrality entails 
mutually reinforcing asymmetries in a network.  
It is important to reiterate that, despite this structural advantage, the cen-
tral organization must rely on so-called “soft powers” for network governance, 
i.e., mediating between different organizations rather than passing out orders.103 
Wren, for example, asserts: “Persuasion, negotiation, and exchange of informa-
tion are the key to integration. Information exchange rather than authority can 
solve the problems of interorganizational coordination.”104  
In general, authors agree that centrally coordinated networks work more 
smoothly than networks which do not have a central, coordinating body. What 
is more, especially in the social sector, it has been demonstrated that centralized 
networks are also more effective, i.e., they are better at what they do than their 
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non-centralized counterparts.105 It must not be forgotten, however, that a coor-
dinating agency must fulfill certain requirements, and that the proposed scope 
must suit tasks and circumstances.  
Synthesis: Key Aspects of Interorganizational Coordination 
It has been shown above that, when trying to build a theoretic reference for 
coordination of UN agencies in peacebuilding, one best looks to organization 
theory, and in particular to network theory. Although arguably not (yet) a fully 
cohesive theory per se, the general themes of network theory go a long way 
towards illuminating questions of interorganizational coordination.  
A basic distinction can be drawn between what are called social control 
elements and structural control elements. One could say that the social control 
elements are those that are idiosyncratic to the network. The structural control 
mechanisms, on the other hand, bring a hierarchical element to the network, but 
not without its having to change its character on the way.  
Treatises on social control mechanisms take assumed parity among net-
work members as a starting point and explain how, in the absence of hierarchy, 
coordination and monitoring can nevertheless take place. Here, social control 
mechanisms like access restriction, culture, reputation, and sanctions play key 
roles. They work well together in that they mutually reinforce one another.  
The introduction of a dedicated coordinating agency within a network is 
one kind of structural control mechanism. In most cases, organizations gain this 
status (coordinating agency) by virtue of their position in the network, i.e., the 
number of ties they maintain to other organizations. Because a coordinating 
agency can sanction other organizations only to a limited extent compared to 
the sanctioning possible in a hierarchy, it must use mainly discursive means to 
facilitate coordination in the network. Whenever this has been possible, it has 
been observed that central networks function more efficiently and in some cases 
even more effectively than networks which do not have this feature.106 
Social and structural control mechanisms are in no way contradictory—on 
the contrary, they, too, mutually reinforce each other. If the social control 
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mechanisms are well established within a network, these are the ones a coordi-
nating agency can play on and augment. For example, it can utilize a shared 
culture to propagate criteria according to which new network members are 
welcomed. If done prudently, the coordinating agency thereby strengthens its 
own position as well as the culture of the network. Together, social and struc-
tural control mechanisms make up the solution space in which network govern-
ance can occur. 
A PEACEBUILDING NETWORK? 
Looking at the UN peacebuilding machinery through a network lens, two broad 
propositions emerge: 
• First, although, out of the three ideal organization forms, the collective of 
UN departments, funds, agencies, and programs looks most like a network; 
there are significant deficits vis-à-vis such an ideal form. This means that 
some prerequisites for establishing network governance are, in this case, ful-
filled only to a suboptimal extent. 
• Second, considering the fact that coordination in UN peacebuilding should 
function according to the network model, too few efforts have been directed 
towards strengthening social control mechanisms and enabling network cen-
trality. Instead, too much energy has gone into trying to solve the coordina-
tion problem by introducing ever new coordination structures. 
Neither proposition can be investigated in exhaustive detail here, but their 
plausibility will nevertheless be validated by illustrating at least one example 
per proposition. If these examples support the overall propositions in a general 
way, more detailed and exhaustive studies are indeed warranted. 
Insufficient Development of Network Characteristics in UN Peacebuilding 
Although it has been noted previously that the collective of UN agencies, funds, 
and programmes comes most closely to a network from a structural perspective, 
it must be acknowledged that the resemblance to an ideal network is still weak 
in some aspects. Most importantly, there is too much overlap between the 
different UN organizations in terms of their organizational mandate, their core 
activities, and their capabilities. In other words, constituting organizations focus 
too little on identifying and developing core strengths and comparative advan-
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tages; instead, they have branched out significantly since their founding, and 
many now occupy the same or very similar spaces. 
The results of the Capacity Inventory in United Nations Peacebuilding, 
initiated at the Secretariat in 2005, and the High-level Panel on System-wide 
Coherence, set up in 2006, make this case very vivid. As mentioned above, the 
capacity inventory groups peacebuilding activities into four broad categories: 
(1) security and public order, (2) justice and reconciliation, (3) governance and 
participation, and (4) socioeconomic well-being. A level below that, 22 issue 
areas that come into play in peacebuilding are identified; for each of these, there 
are usually between two and seven different entities which have a major stake 
in program formulation and execution.107 This means that at least two, but up to 
seven organizations of the UN system do the same (or similar) things in a 
particular programmatic area in peacebuilding. Similarly, the High-level Panel 
on System-wide Coherence notes in its final report that “more than 30 UN 
agencies and programmes have a stake in environmental management.”108 
Interview partners at the United Nations lamented the same conditions. 
Several, for example, highlighted that the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) had somewhat neglected its original mandate of economic 
development and was “chasing the trend” of becoming active in post-conflict 
countries in areas such as governance and supporting the rule of law. One 
observer said that “UNDP basically does everything, but they don’t have a 
comparative advantage in everything.” Conversely, others asserted that 
UNICEF, for example, was a more effective organization than UNDP because it 
had a narrower mandate and had been able to build up expertise accordingly. 
This programmatic overlap among UN entities in many areas means that 
they often compete rather than cooperate or coordinate and, at the same time, 
they can deny responsibility for outcomes. With many players involved, it is 
very difficult to make out who is responsible for what outcome. The High-level 
Panel thus asserts that “even when mandates intersect, UN entities tend to 
operate alone with little synergy and coordination between them,” and it la-
ments the “proliferation of agencies, mandates and offices, creating duplication 
                                                          
107 United Nations Capacities in Peacebuilding 2006. 
108 High-level Panel und System-wide Coherence 2006, p. 10 
Anna Herrhausen • Coordination in UN Peacebuilding 33
 
 
and dulling the focus on outcomes, with moribund entities never discontin-
ued.”109 
The findings of the High-level Panel report also point to the fact that in-
formation and resource flow among UN agencies leaves something to be de-
sired. While some see non-corresponding information technology (IT) solutions 
as a reason why the information flow is hampered,110 one of the authors of the 
Peacebuilding Capacity Inventory puts it bluntly thus: “The UN is very bad at 
knowing what [kind of capacities] it actually has.” Another observer noted that 
“you end up with numerous silos with very little connective tissue”—too many 
staff at the UN think mostly in terms of their own organization or their own 
department, with too little effort being made to seek information and reach out 
to others for exchange and collaboration. Chesterman recounts his time in 
Bosnia, reporting that “in 2000, there were 16 UN agencies that were all techni-
cally being coordinated by the UN, but a survey had to be sent out to ask the 
different agencies what they were actually doing there.” Similarly, one former 
Resident Coordinator in Kosovo noted: “In the beginning, duplication happens. 
After three years, that is over, because agencies know what they are doing 
respectively.”111 Although reported with a positive outlook—viz., once agencies 
know what everyone is doing, duplication is avoided—the fact that this can take 
three years is alarming. Finally, Eide et al. recount another example from the 
UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):  
A high profile effort to create a Joint Mission Assessment Cell (JMAC) in the 
DRC mission failed to include any UN agency representation, and was open 
only to mission personnel. When asked about the lack of UN agency representa-
tion in the JMAC, one official remarked that he had never thought about it. … 
[The] DRC in this regard reflected a lack of awareness about the full capacities 
of the UN system in country, and a lack of “automaticity” about engaging the 
wider system.112 
Obviously, such disregard can have detrimental effects—a “mere” duplication 
of efforts is perhaps the least severe drawback. More alarming are reflections 
concerning, for example, inadequate information flow which can mean that 
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programs are run by agencies that are not suited for the job; or entities of the 
UN system engaged in the same peacebuilding mission which may actually 
work at cross purposes. One practitioner here notes: “Very often, capacities 
were not only poorly coordinated, but they are contradicting each other. You 
might have a situation where the UN is trying to build capacity of a local gov-
ernment by setting up a trust fund to pay civil servants’ salaries, and at the same 
time the government is under fiscal austerity measures from the IMF.”113 Such 
inconsistencies quickly erode the credibility of the UN in the eyes of the local 
population, especially because, in most cases, they view the international 
presence as “the UN” or “the internationals” and therefore have even less 
tolerance for mixed messages.  
Lastly, as Hedlund observed, managing a network and managing an or-
ganization in a network demands particular qualities of employees.114 Com-
pared to hierarchies, a network needs more proactive rather than reactive staff, 
more innovators and not only executors, and people who, in addition to a 
loyalty to their own organization, act in accordance with the welfare of the 
entire network. 
In the context of UN peacebuilding, it has been noted repeatedly that these 
qualities are especially necessary for the Special Representative of the Secre-
tary-General (SRSG). Griffin, for example, asserts that “successful coordination 
between conflict management and development practitioners depends greatly on 
the personnel at the helm,”115 and, according to Chesterman, “Brahimi is the 
reason why Afghanistan didn’t collapse in a heap.”116 Stockton asserts that the 
SRSG needs to have a “combination of luck, charisma, a compelling argument, 
and brilliant communications” to fulfill his role.117  
Most commentators agree, however, that it is by no means given that the 
SRSG actually has these qualities (even though steps in the right direction have 
been undertaken at the UN to assemble a pool of suitable senior leadership 
figures). The overall situation arguably does not look particularly favorable. In 
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2002, the Secretary-General noted in his report, “Strengthening the United 
Nations—An Agenda for Further Change,” that “to attract and retain younger 
people we must transform the Organization’s management culture—
traditionally hierarchical and rigid—to one that stimulates new ideas and the 
vigorous exchange of views, irrespective of grade, seniority and tenure.”118 But 
the 2006 management reform report still notes that the organization has an 
outdated human resources management framework—one that was designed for 
a stable headquarters-based organization, but which remains in place for an 
organization that has over half of its staff in the field. The report also notes that 
too many staff turn away from the United Nations, frustrated by the lack of 
career opportunities and excessive bureaucracy.119 Current policies therefore 
obstruct rather than support the recruitment, training, and promotion of staff 
needed for network management. 
Neglect of Social Control Mechanisms 
In addition to the underdevelopment of ideal network characteristics and pre-
requisites for network governance, the social control mechanisms of network 
governance have also received too little attention in attempts to improve inter-
organizational coordination at the UN. This is probably true for all of the social 
control mechanisms explained above. In line with the proposed way of probing 
the assertions made above, the case of a shared culture (or lack thereof) has 
been selected to exemplify this point. 
The significance of a shared culture has been explained extensively with 
regards to network governance, but shared values, norms, and practices are also 
seen as important by practitioners and scholars of peacebuilding.120 Unfortu-
nately, however, considerable cultural differences exist within the UN system, 
and they do so at several levels. 
The fact that different agencies, funds, and programs and even depart-
ments within the Secretariat have their own distinct culture is often acknowl-
edged. This became apparent, as well, with the account of insufficient informa-
tion flow made above. It should therefore suffice to reiterate at this point that 
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separate governance structures, reporting lines (Security Council, General 
Assembly, or Economic and Social Council), mandates, and staff rules result in 
and comprise distinct organizational cultures for the respective UN entities.121 
Whereas originally this individuality and diversity helped to bolster agencies’ 
independence from political wrangling and let each agency build up staff rules 
that would best serve its needs, this now often prevents those agencies from 
coordinating their approaches. One reason for this, according to Haas, is that 
every organization is interested first and foremost in self-preservation; working 
towards a common goal is only a secondary or tertiary priority. The focus on 
organizational survival, however, leads to selective perception; each organiza-
tion interprets reality in such a way as to define a task for itself: “he who works 
mainly with a hammer sees nails everywhere.” Obviously, such selective per-
ception and interpretation can lead to extensive communication and cooperation 
problems.122 
In addition to these rather general observations, at least two additional di-
mensions at which cultural differences exist and which have important conse-
quences for coordination in peacebuilding can be made out: the headquarters 
(HQ)-field dimension and the mission-country team dimension. 
With regards to the HQ-field dimension, it is commonly asserted that 
headquarters staff has a more political outlook and field staff a more operational 
outlook. This plays out in various ways. First, one could assume that in general, 
HQ personnel are concerned more with the political processes in peacebuilding, 
i.e., empowering and disempowering certain political factions, and navigating 
or shaping neighboring and big power interests. In the field, especially at the 
outset of peacebuilding missions where there are often important humanitarian 
concerns, field staff can be assumed to have a more “practical” outlook, i.e., 
delivering food aid, running refugee camps and facilitating return of refugees, 
reconstructing infrastructure, and so on. This division of labor— crudely speak-
ing, doing politics at headquarters and conducting operations in the field—
probably even makes sense to some extent, and it can certainly not be entirely 
                                                          
121 For a more detailed account, see, for example, “Investing in the United Nations—For a 
Stronger Organization Worldwide,” Report of the Secretary-General, A/60/692, 
7 March 2006. 
122 Haas 2002.  
Anna Herrhausen • Coordination in UN Peacebuilding 37
 
 
reversed. However, it does entail a certain self-selection among staff and, 
without much exchange, it contributes to a disconnect between the two levels. 
This seems to be further exacerbated by current human resources policies. For 
example, although field experience is generally viewed as a must-have in the 
UN system, too much field experience may actually be detrimental for a career 
moving up the bureaucratic ranks: “Good field operators do not have a lot of 
traction at HQ in terms of setting policy.”123 Therefore, those who earnestly 
pursue a UN career make sure that they do not remain in the field for too long, 
for fear of falling out of the loop or not being at the right place at the right time. 
This specialization means that the respective sides do not take each other ade-
quately into account. Accordingly, field staff often complain that HQ sets 
policies which are ill-suited to the situation on the ground, and HQ accuses field 
staff of failing to see the big picture. 
A somewhat related difference is said to exist within the UN field pres-
ence, namely between the UN mission and the UN Country Team (UNCT). 
Although this is often not made clear in the literature, the UN usually maintains 
at least these two institutional set-ups in complex peace operations. The Coun-
try Team encompasses the collection of UN humanitarian and development 
agencies active in a country. It is headed by a Resident Coordinator, who is 
normally the head of the UNDP presence in the country (“Resident Representa-
tive”). The UNCT is distinct from the mission in the sense that, in most cases, 
humanitarian and development agencies have presences in countries long before 
a UN mission (authorized by the Security Council normally under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter) arrives. In Afghanistan, for example, these agencies had 
continued to operate all throughout the Taliban period, even though they had to 
temporarily relocate their headquarters to Islamabad, Pakistan. The UNCT is 
also the presence which is most likely to remain in a country after a mission has 
been withdrawn. UNCT personnel therefore claim that they know the local 
situation much better than mission staff; they generally also tread more care-
fully vis-à-vis local factions because, to some extent, UNCTs depend on such 
local groups in order to be able to carry out their work in the future. The mis-
sion, on the other hand, nowadays comes with a robust military component and 
is injected into a country with its own elaborate support structures. The aim here 
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is to get the mission “up and running” as soon as possible and therefore to 
minimize local dependencies. The discrepancies between the aims and ap-
proaches of the UNTC and those of the mission can have detrimental effects on 
UN-wide coordination. One practitioner noted: “Some coordination problems 
are actually at the level of organizational psychology. There is an element 
where the UN Country Team is extremely suspicious of the mission, which they 
perceive comes in from outer space. The mission, on the other hand, has no 
incentive to coordinate, because it is entirely self-contained.”124 In Kosovo, 
UNCT members and a former Resident Coordinator noted that they had an 
extremely difficult time gaining access to the mission until the appointment of 
Søren Jessen-Petersen in June 2004.(Jessen-Petersen was extensively familiar 
with the UN system, having served both as Assistant High Commissioner of 
Refugees at the UNHCR in Geneva and as Director of the UNHCR’s Liaison 
office at UN Headquarters in New York.) The mission-country team disconnect 
is supposed to be minimized by the integrated mission concept, whereby the 
Country Team is supposed to be incorporated into the mission by making the 
Resident Coordinator also one of the two Deputy Special Representatives 
(DSRSG) of the mission. Nevertheless, the 2005 report on Integrated Missions 
reads thus:  
In almost all cases, members of the UNCT held that they were not involved in 
the planning of the new mission to the degree they would like. A large number 
of field staff felt that mission planners had created structures from preconceived 
and mostly inappropriate templates. Mission planners are often seen as being 
oblivious to the experience, capacity and mandate of other UN actors.125 
It can be seen, therefore, that problems of miscommunication and competition 
that result from different organizational cultures can persist despite structural 
adjustments such as designating the SRSG as the leader of the entire UN effort 
in a particular country. 
Convoluted Structural Mechanisms 
As explained previously, network governance through social control mecha-
nisms can be aided by structural elements, namely, by inserting a hierarchy-like 
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constituent—a central or focal organization—as the main arbiter of information 
and perhaps even other resources. Thus, even though a network relies mainly on 
the social control mechanisms outlined above for coordination, structural 
arrangements can also become important: they can make a network run more 
efficiently and, by facilitating directed information and resource flow, they can 
also make a network run more effectively. A combination of social control 
elements and structural elements seems to be the ideal solution. 
An argument of this paper is that, in accordance with this proposed rem-
edy, the UN has so far concentrated too much on structural mechanisms and too 
little on social control elements. Eide et al. assert, too, that “integration is at 
least as much about process as it is about structures,”126 but find that, so far, the 
UN has focused too much about structures of missions.127 The focus on struc-
tural mechanisms seems to have had two effects: one, there are too many struc-
tural coordination mechanisms and, two, they do not function properly. To the 
contrary, the coordination costs they entail in terms of occupying people’s time 
and energy sometimes seem to become noticeably high.128 Jones, for example 
labels interagency coordination mechanisms at the UN “labyrinthine” and 
“Kafkaesque,” 129  and Cutillo, too, finds the proliferation of coordination 
mechanisms problematic. 
What makes coordination in the post-conflict context particularly complex is the 
coexistence of political, humanitarian, and development actors and mechanisms. 
Just as an example, while for humanitarian purposes the main coordination bod-
ies are the IASC130 and the ECHA131, for development activities it is the UN De-
velopment Group (UNDG) chaired by UNDP. Symmetrically, while the CAP is 
the main document prepared by the UN system to define assistance needs and 
funding requests in humanitarian situations, in “ordinary” development situa-
tions the system produces other documents, such as the Common Country As-
sessment (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). 
Parallel coordination mechanisms operate on the ground.132 
                                                          
126 Eide et al. 2005, p. 10. 
127 Eide et al. 2005. 
128 Pouligny 2005, p. 500. 
129 Jones in Donini et al. 2004, p. 217. 
130 Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
131 Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs 
132 Cutillo 2006, pp. 24-25. 
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SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
This paper has presented a case for fresh thinking on coordination in UN peace-
building, and it has argued that to look at organization theory could be a fruitful 
endeavor for informing the current debate. A consistent model of the concept of 
coordination as treated in the theory has been developed, where coordination 
has first been related to its respective organization forms—hierarchies, markets 
and networks—and then developed further in its most appropriate manifestation, 
namely, network governance. Network governance has been shown to rely 
primarily on social control mechanisms but to be enhanced by network central-
ity—a structural element. 
By applying insights from network theory to UN peacebuilding, it has 
been shown that deficits at the UN exist on several different levels but particu-
larly at the level of the development of network characteristics as prerequisites 
for network governance and at the level of network governance itself. Examples 
have been recounted to support this view. In order to improve interorganiza-
tional coordination at the UN, therefore, a number of efforts might be consid-
ered. For example, programmatic overlap could be reduced and, in that way, the 
system could be brought closer to an ideal network form. Greater focus should 
also be given to designing processes in such a way that social control mecha-
nisms can function better, for example, in the areas of communication and 
human resources policies. Furthermore, rather than introducing ever more 
coordination structures, the structural landscape should be simplified, and 
complementary central organizations/bodies in the field and at Headquarters 
should be established. Coordination at the UN will probably always remain a 
challenge, but it has been shown that organization theory can aid detailed 
analysis on where the problems lie as well as offer some ideas which should 
help to tackle them. 
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